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“A storm is coming and I know what I’ll be doing when it claims my first
patient. What will you be doing? What will you have done? We have told
you who is at risk. Please let as many out as you possibly can. end.”1
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, long before the sweeping impact of COVID-19, the
criminal legal system in New York City has been on a halting path toward
decarceration. Set against the national backdrop of declining crime rates and
a reckoning with the economic, social, and racial costs of mass
criminalization and incarceration, elected officials in New York City and
State have acknowledged that a shift toward reducing the number of people
held in New York City jails is long overdue.2 Particular attention has been
focused on Rikers Island, the notoriously violent, sprawling jail complex,
which has been regarded as one of the most visibly troubling aspects of the
administration of criminal “justice” in New York City. With its reputation
for corruption, violence, and human rights abuses, Rikers has become the
final resting place for New York City’s failed social welfare and criminal
legal systems.3 Former New York State Court of Appeals Chief Justice
Jonathan Lippman has called Rikers Island “a stain on the soul of New York
City.”4

2. In an official statement touting his change of policy on closing Rikers Island, Mayor
Bill de Blasio proclaimed:
Mass incarceration did not begin in New York City, but it will end here . . . . With
the lowest rate of incarceration of any major city, we are proving you don’t need to
arrest your way to safety. New York is a telling a different story, one where we can
keep fathers at home and kids in schools and still be the safest big city in America.
Press Release, City of N.Y., Projected City Jail Population Falls to 3,300 by 2026 (Oct. 15,
2019)
[hereinafter
Projected
City
Jail
Population],
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/484-19/projected-city-jail-population-falls3-300-2026 [https://perma.cc/4S7C-RY2U].
3. See Michael Jacobson et al., Beyond the Island: Changing the Culture of New York
City Jails, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 376 (2018). See generally This Is Rikers, MARSHALL
PROJECT (June 28, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/28/this-is-rikers
[https://perma.cc/L3A5-4L4P].
4. Closing Rikers Island: A Catalyst for Criminal Justice Reform, CITY LAND (Apr. 16,
2019),
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As the primary jail complex for New York City, Rikers Island currently
has eight facilities that house people who are held in pretrial detention,
sentenced to less than one year in jail, or accused of violating the conditions
of their New York State parole.5 New York City’s jail system has
historically been among the largest in the world and manages a significant
number of detainees, predominately Black and Latinx, who deal with
homelessness as well as substance and mental health concerns.6 At its peak
in 1991, City jails held over 21,000 people.7 In the past two decades as crime
has fallen, the population of people held in detention in New York City jails
has also dropped.8
Within recent years, criminal legal reform organizers and advocates have
seized the downward trends in crime and broader rejection of mass
incarceration policies to galvanize the support of backers in New York City
and State government and push for the closure of Rikers Island.9 In October
2019, the New York City Council voted in favor of a plan to close Rikers
Island by 2026 and replace it with four smaller borough-based jails,
drastically reducing the space available for incarceration in New York City.10
This vote came over the objection of more abolitionist-oriented advocates,
who want to see Rikers Island closed, but oppose investing public funds in
the construction of new jails.11 Nonetheless, the announcement was heralded
https://www.citylandnyc.org/closing-rikers-island-a-catalyst-for-criminal-justice-reform/
[https://perma.cc/88DE-LRT9].
5. There are also two other jails runs by New York City Department of Correction in
Manhattan and Brooklyn. See Facilities Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/facilities.page [https://perma.cc/6W8T-H98H] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2020).
6. See Ross MacDonald et al., The Rikers Island Hot Spotters: Defining the Needs of the
Most Frequently Incarcerated, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2262, 2262 (2015).
7. See Judith A. Greene & Vincent Schiraldi, Better by Half: The New York City Story
of Winning Large-Scale Decarceration While Improving Public Safety, 29 FED. SENT’G REP.
22, 22 (2016).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 36. (“New York’s unprecedented reduction in reliance on incarceration has
been a bottom-up, advocacy-driven, community-focused strategy, as opposed to their
topdown, technocratic, elite-consensus approach. In New York, public officials and policy
makers have been relentlessly pressured by vigorous demands from advocates, organizers,
and activists, who have also worked tirelessly to educate the public about the need for a more
humane and effective criminal justice system.”).
10. See Matthew Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
17,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/6UMD-SHWB].
11. Advocates with an abolitionist vision did not support the plan to spend billions in
public funds to replace Rikers Island with newly constructed, smaller borough-based jails.
See Gabriel Sayegh, Making Sense of the Fight over NYC Jails, KATAL CTR. FOR EQUITY
HEALTH & JUST. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.katalcenter.org/makingsenserikers
[https://perma.cc/GM9B-P7EU].
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by those in city government as New York City’s “historic decarceration”
plan.12 Yet, for the City’s closure plan to be possible, the Mayor estimated
that it would take a period of years well beyond his tenure to drastically
reduce the jail population to fewer than 6,000 people.13
Even before the City Council’s vote, stakeholders were beginning to
closely examine what reforms would be necessary at earlier stages of the
criminal legal process to shrink New York City’s jail population.14 They
explored administrative changes such as increased use of diversion,
supervised release, and policy modifications within the New York Police
Department (NYPD) and local district attorneys’ offices.15 In April 2019, in
a major legislative boost to the efforts to close Rikers, New York State
passed wide-reaching criminal justice reform legislation that eliminated
money bail and pretrial detention for virtually all misdemeanor and
non-violent felony offenses, provided for early disclosure of prosecutorial
evidence, and strengthened speedy trial rights.16 These changes, while not a
panacea for the ills of the criminal legal system, did represent a significant
step forward in efforts to shift the City’s overreliance on incarceration and
excessively punitive approaches.
In January 2020, just before the COVID-19 outbreak, the population of
New York City jails was as at a low of 5,721, 17 and New York State’s
legislative changes had just gone into effect.18 With the emergence of
COVID-19 in New York City in March, advocates and public defenders
began to publicly warn about the impending public health crisis of
COVID-19 and the need for the rapid reduction of the census on Rikers

12. See Projected City Jail Population, supra note 2.
13. See JB Nicholas, Close Rikers in Under 10 Years? It Can Be Done, VILL. VOICE (May
23,
2017),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/05/23/close-rikers-in-under-10-years-it-can-be-done
[https://perma.cc/C3GW-B33B].
14. See generally INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. & INCARCERATION REFORM, A
MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY (2017) [hereinafter A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY],
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6de4731aef1de914f43628/t/5b96c6f81ae6cf5e9c5f1
86d/1536607993842/Lippman%2BCommission%2BReport%2BFINAL%2BSingles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7W7-MK8S].
15. See id.
16. See Making Sense of Bail Reform in NYS, Part 2, KATAL CTR. FOR EQUITY HEALTH &
JUST.
(May
17,
2019),
https://www.katalcenter.org/bailreform_nys2
[https://perma.cc/Q8MJ-WT67].
17. N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF CRIM. JUST., NEW YORK CITY JAIL POPULATION REDUCTION
IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020) [hereinafter MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020],
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-factsheet-MA
Y-25-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/367N-RU7Z].
18. See Making Sense of Bail Reform in NYS, Part 2, supra note 16.
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Island and in other City jail facilities.19 Public health officials, the Board of
Correction, and other oversight groups recommended actions to minimize
the impact of COVID-19, such as decreasing the jail population and
admissions, as well as drastically reducing face-to-face contact in precincts,
courts, and sites of community supervision.20 Notably, these actions fit
within the rationale of effective strategies for decarceration more generally.21
This Article examines how the City’s broader decarceration agenda can
be informed by the lessons learned from efforts to rapidly depopulate Rikers
Island during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak. It argues that long term
decarceration in New York City will not be realized without meaningful
investments in necessary social supports and a willingness to shift away from
outmoded conceptions of public safety. The economic instability brought
about by COVID-19 undoubtedly make these financial and ideological
changes all the more necessary and complex. Part I provides a brief
overview of the pre-COVID-19 approach to decarceration in New York City.
Part II details how various institutional actors responded to the need to
accelerate the release of people detained at Rikers Island during the height
of the pandemic.
It highlights the often-regressive character of
decision-making by police, prosecutors, courts, and government agencies
during the pandemic. Part III argues that critical insights gained during the
systemic response to the initial COVID-19 outbreak should inform ongoing
decarceration efforts in New York City. It contends that the City’s
COVID-19 response shows that many institutional actors across the City are
only willing to do the bare minimum in achieving decarceration, even when
the lives of detained people and City employees are at stake. This Article
proposes movement away from deeply entrenched, punitive practices and
policies and more expansive investment in non-carceral services and
institutions for a meaningful, long-term decarceral agenda.

19. See Jan Ransom & Alan Feuer, ‘A Storm Is Coming’: Fears of an Inmate Epidemic
as the Virus Spreads in the Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/nyregion/nyc-coronavirus-rikers-island.html
[https://perma.cc/X35M-N43L].
20. See id. See generally Jonathan Lippman & Tyler Nims, Let More People out of Rikers:
The Coronavirus Demands Bolder Action to Decarcerate, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-let-more-people-out-of-rikers-20200418-caf
itdk7sjamljylgskfts73se-story.html [https://perma.cc/A383-4V84]; Peter Wagner & Emily
Widra, Five Ways the Criminal Justice System Could Slow the Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/27/slowpandemic/.
[https://perma.cc/NV72-LS9U].
21. See DENNIS SCHRANTZ, STEPHEN DEBOR & MARC MAUER, SENT’G PROJECT,
DECARCERATION STRATEGIES: HOW 5 STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION
REDUCTIONS
6–7
(2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration-strategies-5-states-achieved-s
ubstantial-prison-population-reductions/ [https://perma.cc/SM6G-B6GH].
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I. DECARCERATION BEFORE COVID-19
The movement toward decarceral policies in New York City is largely the
result of efforts to close Rikers Island. Over the past several decades, Rikers
Island has served as an inhumane warehouse for people at the margins of life
in New York City due to poverty, structural racism, and mental and
substance abuse issues.22 The majority of people held at Rikers are pretrial
detainees, people who are presumed innocent but remain behind bars
because they have been denied bail or because they do not have the financial
resources to pay the bail amount set.23
Rikers Island, with its
well-documented reputation for violence, racial inequities, and punitiveness,
represents many of the larger criminal legal system’s ills.24
While local officials have been aware of the problems at Rikers Island for
quite some time, a reduction in arrest and crime rates and concerns about the
impact of mass incarceration made it politically feasible to explore the
political and legal strategies necessary to close Rikers and shrink the overall
jail capacity in New York City.25 This Part gives a brief overview of recent
decarceration efforts in New York City. It highlights the history of violence
and abuse at Rikers and outlines the various pre-COVID-19 measures taken
to reduce the detained population and move toward diminished reliance on
jails.
A. The Case for Closing Rikers Island
In October 2019, the New York City Council approved a plan to close
Rikers Island and replace it with a number of smaller borough-based jails by
2026.26 The vote marked a significant milestone after years of grassroots
advocacy and political maneuvering and promised, at least in word, to put
New York City “at the forefront of a national movement to reverse decades
of mass incarceration that disproportionately affected black and Hispanic
people.”27 The vote was indeed historic. For over eight decades, Rikers
Island has served as the primary criminal detention facility for New York

22. See generally A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14.
23. See Janos Marton, #CLOSErikers: The Campaign to Transform New York City’s
Criminal Justice System, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 499, 526 (2018).
24. See Darren Walker, Lessons from Rikers Island, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/rikers-island/525858/
[https://perma.cc/2TPN-SDEE].
25. See Jarrett Murphy, It Will Take Tenacity and Guts to Shutter One of the Country’s
Most
Notorious
Jails,
NATION
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/it-will-take-tenacity-and-guts-to-shutter-one-of-th
e-countrys-most-notorious-jails/ [https://perma.cc/MR2X-GXYX].
26. See Haag, supra note 10.
27. Id.
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City.28 As the number of facilities and people held on Rikers Island grew
over the years, so did its reputation for violence, corruption, and
mismanagement.29 Despite many efforts to reform and even close down
Rikers in the past, the political, fiscal, and social conditions never quite
converged until this moment.30
Rikers Island was built to replace its predecessor, Blackwell’s Island
penitentiary, which was marked by overcrowding and corruption.31 Before
its opening in 1935, Rikers Island was touted as a space that would allow
detainees to reenter society with better “mental and moral health” and with
valuable vocational training.32
However, mismanagement and
overcrowding marked Rikers Island from the beginning.33 Yet it was not
until the 1960s and 1970s that the foundation for modern-day problems with
the facility developed.34 During this time frame, the social, economic, and
racial upheaval happening in New York City contributed to the steady
population increases and racial disparities that have become hallmarks of the
institution.35 The demographic composition of Rikers Island “evolved from
a jail population that was 85% white in 1930 to 35% white by 1970 to 92.5%
people of color in 2015.”36 The New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s
also took funds away from City jails, depriving the facility of resources and
deepening substandard conditions of confinement.37
The first major government-driven attempt to close Rikers Island occurred
during Ed Koch’s mayoral administration.38 After a number of litigation
efforts against the City and failed reform attempts, Koch appointed Herb
Sturz, known for his work on bail reform and as a founding director of the
Manhattan Project (later known as the Vera Institute), as deputy mayor for
criminal justice.39 Sturz evaluated the severely deficient conditions at Rikers

28. See Marton, supra note 23, at 500.
29. See id. at 503–04.
30. See id. at 516–18.
31. See id. at 507.
32. See id.
33. See This Is Rikers, supra note 3.
34. See Jacobson et al., supra note 3, at 384–86.
35. See Marton, supra note 23, at 508–10.
36. Id. at 509.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 508–10.
39. See JB Nicholas, A History Of Hell: How Rikers Island Became a Modern Municipal
Abomination,
VILL.
VOICE
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/04/11/a-history-of-hell-how-rikers-island-became-a-mo
dern-municipal-abomination/ [https://perma.cc/MM5W-EPWB] (“In 1975, prisoners held in
New York City’s jails filed seven separate class-action lawsuits in federal court that
challenged thirty discrete areas of prison administration and, collectively, alleged that the
conditions they were confined under were inhumane and unlawful under the Constitution. But
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and its remote and inaccessible location and recommended that the City sell
the property to the state and use the proceeds to create smaller jail facilities
within reach of criminal courts in each borough.40 Sturz’s proposals were
never adopted, in part because of the rising crime rate and the rapid
expansion of the jail population.41
The 1990s marked the notable emergence of hyper-aggressive policing
strategies, gang influence, and significant overcrowding at Rikers Island,
with the daily population reaching close to 22,000.42 The number of
corrections officers working within Rikers facilities also increased, bringing
along more powerful gear such as “pepper spray, mace, and electrified stun
shields.”43 All of these conditions helped encourage a culture of brutal
violence.44 By the 2000s, as the City’s crime rate began to fall, the number
of homicides dropped from 2,245 in 1990 to 334 in 2016. 45 Yet, even as the
number of people held at Rikers gradually decreased, the culture of violence
and brutality persisted.46
A few particularly significant, high-profile examples of the problems at
Rikers Island helped to bring the ills of New York City’s infamous jail
complex into popular consciousness. In October 2008, while being held in
an adolescent facility on Rikers Island, 18-year-old Christopher Robinson
was viciously beaten and killed by other detained teens.47 The Department
of Correction Intelligence Unit and the Bronx District Attorney’s Office
launched investigations into Christopher Robinson’s killing, which
confirmed the existence of an enterprise known as “the Program,” an
elaborate scheme in which corrections officers “either look the other way, or

the administration of Mayor Abraham Beame was consumed by the city’s existential financial
crisis, and it paid little attention to the lawsuits.”).
40. See Marton, supra note 23, at 511.
41. Martin Horn, who served as DOC Commissioner from 2002–2010, was also
convinced that City jails needed to be decentralized. However, community opposition to
building new facilities in the Bronx thwarted his plans. See id. at 516–17.
42. See id. at 513.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 513–14.
45. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14, at 22.
46. See Marton, supra note 23, at 519. The problem of violence at Rikers Island has
continued up until recently. According to a federal monitor’s report, from 2016 to 2019, use
of force by guards at Rikers Island increased by 54% despite a falling jail population. See
Benjamin Weiser, Violence at Rikers at an ‘All-Time High’ Despite City’s Promise to Curb
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/nyregion/rikers-island-violence-guards.html
[perma.cc/VB6L-47XA].
47. See Russ Buettner, Rikers Extortions Noted Before Death, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/nyregion/16rikers.html
[https://perma.cc/D2PS-2BXQ]; Geoffrey Gray, The Lords of Rikers, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 28,
2011), https://nymag.com/news/features/70978 [https://perma.cc/9G83-648M].
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actively enable, tougher inmates to beat up on weaker ones in order to control
them and extort their privileges.”48 The Bronx District Attorney charged at
least three corrections officers and a number of incarcerated young people
with recruiting and serving as “managers, foot soldiers and enforcers” within
the jail facilities and “deciding where and when attacks would occur.”49 The
extensive scale of “the Program” provided a window into a deep-seated and
extreme culture of violence and corruption at Rikers Island.50
In August 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York, then led by Preet Bharara, issued a 79-page report
describing in detail the complicity and “powerful code of silence” that
allowed for brutal violence to continue unabated at the hands of staff and
detainees on Rikers Island.51
The report detailed officer-created
punishments that included assaults to the head, beatings, and removals of
detainees to isolated areas outside of video view.52 The report also
documented officers’ extended and excessive use of solitary confinement
against detainees.53
In September 2014, The New Yorker first reported the tragic case of Kalief
Browder.54 Mr. Browder was 16-years-old when he was arrested for stealing

48. Sadhbh Walshe, Is Rikers Island Jail with ‘The Program’?, GUARDIAN (May 16,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/may/16/is-rikers-island-jail-w
ith-the-program [https://perma.cc/8XMB-8R55]; see also Gray, supra note 47.
49. Benjamin Weiser, Lawsuits Suggest Pattern of Rikers Guards Looking Other Way,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/nyregion/04rikers.html
[https://perma.cc/4G6A-DVSE].
50. See Gray, supra note 47.
51. See Benjamin Weiser & Michael Schwirtz, U.S. Finds a ‘Culture of Violence’ Against
Teenage
Inmates
at
Rikers
Island,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
5,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/nyregion/us-attorneys-office-reveals-civil-rights-inve
stigation-at-rikers-island.html [https://perma.cc/ZXA5-4JTX].
52. See id.
53. See id. It is well documented that people subjected to solitary confinement experience
extreme psychological and physical harm. Many psychologists and human rights
organizations regard solitary confinement as a form of torture. See Juan E. Méndez (Special
Rapporteur), Hum. Rts. Council on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc.
A/66/268
(Aug.
5.
2011),
http://www.solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22QT-8TXG]; Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement,
22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 327 (2006) (detailing the extreme psychiatric harm of solitary
confinement); Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole#ixzz0gGPlkqY7
[https://perma.cc/TU2M-GYUA].
54. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law
[https://perma.cc/9DZJ-JWJT].
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a backpack and held at Rikers, in both solitary confinement and general
population, for more than three years before the charges against him were
finally dismissed.55 The article was particularly compelling because it
highlighted for the general public not only the inhumane abuses of Rikers,
but also the way the entire legal process — from bail to discovery to speedy
trial — and all the court actors — from prosecutor to defense attorney to
judge — were responsible for Mr. Browder’s tragic circumstances.56 Mr.
Browder’s subsequent death by suicide after his release from jail deepened
the heartbreaking nature of his story and has been used by many as a call to
action to close Rikers and bring about meaningful policy and legislative
reform.57
B. New York City’s Road to Decarceration
New York City would have been unlikely to adopt a movement toward
decarceration and the closure of Rikers Island without the mobilization
efforts of grassroots activists, advocates, and community members.
Organizing groups intensified the pressure on local and state politicians,
which in turn brought about new policy directives and legislative reforms
aimed at shrinking the population at Rikers. This Section highlights how
organizing, policy, and legislation have provided the foundation for
decarceration efforts in New York City before the emergence of COVID-19.
i. Community Organizing
The atrocities of Rikers Island that gained widespread media attention
were already fueling an agenda for grassroots change in New York City.
Conditions at Rikers Island, as well as the NYPD’s aggressive use of stop
and frisk and culture of violence as demonstrated in the chokehold killing of
Eric Garner, served as flash points for organized protests and uprisings
across the City.58 Thus, it should come as no surprise that grassroots
organizing played a vitally important role in advancing decarceral policies

55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for
3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-y
ears-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/2Z7G-YFRS].
58. See John Leland & Colin Moynihan, Thousands March Silently to Protest
Stop-and-Frisk
Policies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
17,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/thousands-march-silently-to-protest-stop-an
d-frisk-policies.html [https://perma.cc/G72E-PFDJ]; Megan Specia & Colin Dalieda, How
Twitter and Facebook Helped Shut Down Lower Manhattan for Eric Garner, MASHABLE
(Dec.
5,
2014),
https://mashable.com/2014/12/05/protests-eric-garner-grassroots/
[https://perma.cc/M94E-LFYF].
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across New York City’s criminal legal system and in advocating for the
closure of Rikers Island.59
Groups such as the Campaign to Shut Down Rikers, Millions March
NYC, and Jails Action Coalition used the mobilization power of incarcerated
and formerly incarcerated people and their allies to push not only for the
closure of Rikers Island but, importantly, the City’s broader divestment from
carceral structures such as policing and prisons.60 These alliances insisted
that Rikers Island be closed and that government funds be used for necessary
services that would help keep people out of the system, such as education,
healthcare, and housing.61 One coalition, No New Jails, which advocates for
the closure of Rikers and prison abolition through opposing the construction
of new jails, has drawn public attention to the amount of money the City
currently spends on carceral systems instead of communities.62 In particular,
they highlight the $8.7 billion needed for building new jails and the
continued increase in the Department of Correction budget despite the
decline in incarceration.63 They point out that in Fiscal Year 2018, the
average annual cost to incarcerate a person in New York City jails surpassed
$300,000, which is money that could be spent on affordable housing,

59. There are a number of campaigns across the City and State working for decarceration
of jails and prisons. See, e.g., FREE THEM ALL FOR PUB. HEALTH,
https://freethemall4publichealth.org/ [https://perma.cc/3523-C6RH] (last visited Oct. 14,
2020);
RELEASE
AGING
PEOPLE
PRISON,
http://rappcampaign.com/
[https://perma.cc/XPW9-UTLK] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). For information on the campaign
to
close
Rikers
Island,
see
#CLOSErikers,
JUSTLEADERSHIPUSA,
http://jlusa.org/campaign/closerikers/#:~:text=In%20April%202016%2C%20JustLeadership
USA%20launched,policy%20of%20New%20York%20City
[https://perma.cc/5D6M-AVG4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
60. See Raven Rakia & Ashoka Jegroo, How the Push to Close Rikers Went from No Jails
to
New
Jails,
APPEAL
(May
29,
2018),
https://theappeal.org/how-the-push-to-close-rikers-went-from-no-jails-to-new-jails/
[https://perma.cc/M5ZJ-JQGS].
61. See id.
62. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller Scott M. Stringer, Comptroller Stringer:
Despite a Decline in Incarceration, Correction Spending, Violence, and Use of Force
Continued to Rise in FY 2018 (Jan. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Despite a Decline in Incarceration],
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-despite-a-decline-in-incarceratio
n-correction-spending-violence-and-use-of-force-continued-to-rise-in-fy-2018/
[https://perma.cc/V7MQ-DRXJ]; NO NEW JAILS NYC, CLOSE RIKERS NOW, WE KEEP US
SAFE: A NEW YORKER’S GUIDE TO BUILDING COMMUNITY CARE AND SAFETY BY CLOSING
RIKERS
WITH
NO
NEW
JAILS
(VERSION
2.0)
(2019),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NPW9cNv6AsbKYF_se4d8lIHQ5cyHOvOx/view
[https://perma.cc/8L9H-RX7B]; Emily Nonko, What Would ‘No New Jails’ Actually Look
Like?,
GOTHAMIST
(July
16,
2019,
3:05
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/what-would-no-new-jails-actually-look-like
[https://perma.cc/QW2H-LUDM].
63. See Nonko, supra note 62; Despite a Decline in Incarceration, supra note 62.
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improving mental healthcare and schools, or in investments in
community-based programs like violence interruption.64
Another organizing group that played a critical role in the effort to close
Rikers Island was the #CLOSErikers campaign led by JustLeadershipUSA.65
The #CLOSErikers campaign was composed of directly impacted
individuals and over 100 non-profits and partner organizations across the
City.66 The group used three strategic approaches in its advocacy by (1)
seeking to influence the public narrative about Rikers Island and its detainees
through public actions and digital outreach, (2) putting pressure on elected
officials who would support a closure plan, and (3) aligning the coalition
with decarceral policy changes that would lead to the closure of Rikers.67
Specifically, #CLOSErikers advocated for decarceral policies such as
modifying pretrial detention, “eliminating city sentences of one year or less
and replacing them with alternatives like community service; revamping the
parole supervision system; and decriminalizing low-level, non-violent
crimes like turnstile jumping.”68
One important difference between grassroots groups pushing for the
closure of Rikers, like Shut Down Rikers and No New Jails, and the
#CLOSErikers campaign centered on the issue of constructing new
borough-based jails. The leadership of the #CLOSErikers campaign
ultimately took a position that supporting the closure of Rikers Island and
the construction of smaller borough-based jails is a tangible step toward
decreasing the current levels of incarceration in the City.69 However, even
Rikers was designed to be a better, more modern jail when it was built.
Therefore many abolitionist organizers are convinced that building new jails
will allow government actors to continue to focus on incarceration rather
than social investment.70 They are instead eager to see attention paid to the
underlying social and institutional dysfunction that has allowed incarceration
to proliferate.
ii. The Lippman Commission Report and the Mayor’s Smaller Safer Fairer
Roadmap
In February 2016, New York City Council Speaker Melissa
Mark-Viverito spearheaded a privately funded independent commission to

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Nonko, supra note 62; Despite a Decline in Incarceration, supra note 62.
See Rakia & Jegroo, supra note 60.
See id.
See Marton, supra note 23, at 535.
Nonko, supra note 62.
See id.
See Rakia & Jegroo, supra note 60.
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study the criminal legal system and Rikers Island and to make
recommendations on fundamental reforms.71 Former New York State Chief
Judge Jonathan Lippman chaired the commission and worked with leaders
from across the private and public sectors to examine the issues connected
to Rikers Island and author a comprehensive report. In 2017, The
Independent Commission on New York City Criminal Justice and
Incarceration Reform issued what has come to be known as the Lippman
Commission Report, which provided a powerful rebuke of the jail facility:
“Closing Rikers Island is a moral imperative. The Island is a powerful
symbol of a discredited approach to criminal justice — a penal colony that
subjects all within its walls to inhumane conditions.”72 The report
highlighted the policies that needed to be implemented in order to reduce the
City’s reliance on detention and asserted that the jail population, which
hovered around 9,700 at that point, would need to be reduced to 5,000 for
Rikers Island to close and be replaced with smaller borough-based jails.73 It
also explored measures to transform pretrial detention into a rehabilitative
rather than punitive process and contemplated other uses for the space that
the Rikers facilities currently occupy, emphasizing housing and employment
reinvestment for the communities most impacted by mass incarceration.74
Following the release of the Lippman Commission Report, and trying to
seize on the political moment, Mayor de Blasio’s office released Smaller
Safer Fairer: A Roadmap to Closing Rikers,75 which presented reforms that,
in large part, overlapped with the Lippman Commission Report’s
recommendations.76 After previously characterizing efforts to close Rikers
as “a noble concept” that was unpractical,77 Mayor de Blasio joined the calls

71. See J. David Goodman, Melissa Mark-Viverito, Council Speaker, Vows to Pursue
Criminal
Justice
Reforms,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
11,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/melissa-mark-viverito-council-speaker-vow
s-to-pursue-new-criminal-justice-reforms.html [https://perma.cc/3GXE-ZK4L].
72. A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 14, at 19.
73. See id. at 71–75, 88 (noting the utility of borough-based jails and discussing the
necessity of a jail population reduction to 5,000).
74. See id. at 61–62, 105 (discussing sentencing reforms that favor rehabilitation and
referencing employment and housing opportunities that come from closing Rikers Island).
75. See Mayor de Blasio Announces “Smaller, Safer, Fairer: A Roadmap to Closing
Rikers
Island,”
OFF.
MAYOR,
CITY
N.Y.
(June
22,
2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/427-17/mayor-de-blasio-smaller-safer-faire
r—roadmap-closing-rikers-island- [https://perma.cc/ZZ43-HR9A]. See generally OFF. OF THE
MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., SMALLER SAFER FAIRER: A ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND
(2017)
[hereinafter
SMALLER
SAFER
FAIRER],
https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/Smaller-Safer-Fairer-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q95S-G24L].
76. See id. at 26.
77. See J. David Goodman, De Blasio Says Idea of Closing Rikers Jail Complex Is
Unrealistic,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2016),

70

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

for Rikers Island’s closure and announced the appointment of a Task Force
charged with implementing the recommendations outlined in his office’s
Smaller Safer Fairer roadmap.78 The roadmap identifies changes in the
City’s criminal legal process to reduce the City’s jail population, such as
facilitating the payment of bail, supplanting short-term jail sentences with
programs, utilizing supervised release, processing cases through the courts
more quickly, and reducing the reliance on jails for cases involving mental
health or substance abuse concerns.79 The roadmap details a vision of jails
that are “safe and humane,” with an emphasis on greater mental health
treatment, rehabilitative programming, and less use of punitive
segregation.80 The Mayor’s plan proposes a significantly reduced City jail
population, primarily composed of people who are considered “violent” or
“chronic.”81 The roadmap also continues to invest in the carceral system by
proposing the allocation of $100 million to training new corrections
officers.82
While the City’s plan highlights specific steps aimed at altering the current
methods of criminal “justice” in New York City, the reforms focus primarily
on speeding up the process and improving the experience of the system,
rather than on addressing the issues that cause people to come into contact
with the system in the first place. Notably, funds are directed toward
constructing newer and more modern decentralized jails and training
corrections staff.83 The extent to which funds might support improvements
in access to education, health, mental health, and substance abuse treatment
outside of the carceral system is largely unaddressed. Relatedly, the
roadmap proposes very limited interventions for other key actors in the
system: district attorneys are tasked with improving case processing times,84
refining risk assessments,85 and expanding the use of supervised release and
diversion.86 Prosecutors and police officers are not urged to explore how
changes in their discretionary policies might lead to fewer arrests and
prosecutions.

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/nyregion/de-blasio-says-idea-of-closing-rikers-jail-co
mplex-is-unrealistic.html [https://perma.cc/C8PF-SGB5]. See generally SMALLER SAFER
FAIRER, supra note 75.
78. See generally SMALLER SAFER FAIRER, supra note 75.
79. See id. at 8.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 11–18.
82. See id. at 36.
83. See id. at 9, 36.
84. See id. at 26–27.
85. See id. at 19.
86. See id. at 21.
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The strategies proposed by the Mayor’s office address the low-hanging
fruit of decarceration but fail to take on more challenging issues such as
re-thinking our approach to detaining so-called violent offenders in pretrial
detention.87 By investing billions in new borough-based jails to incarcerate
“violent” and “chronic” people, many of the most intractable problems of the
criminal punishment system remain unaddressed. The construction of four
local jail facilities is likely to carry Rikers Island’s same culture of violence
and deprivation to new locations. Additionally, given that implementation
of these strategies would extend beyond the term of Bill de Blasio and the
current City Council, many rightly question whether a plan that relies on the
support of future elected officials, continued decline in crime rates, and
constantly evolving dynamics will ever actually come to fruition.88 The
reverberations of the social and fiscal crisis brought on by COVID-19 only
serve to deepen these concerns.
iii. New York State Criminal Legislative Reforms
In 2019, New York State passed a historic set of criminal legislative
reforms that would significantly impact New York City’s criminal legal
process and decarceral efforts.89 The legislation focused on bail reform,
speedy trial, and discovery — areas that most impact the length of detention
and the duration of a criminal case.
Of all the changes to the statutory scheme, the reform of the cash bail
system presents the most immediate impact on reducing the population of
pretrial detainees. In New York State, judges historically had a set of factors
to consider when determining whether and how much money bail was
required to ensure an accused person’s appearance for subsequent court
dates.90 Considering a person’s dangerousness to the community, or
so-called preventative detention, has never been an explicit factor permitted
by statute. Nonetheless, judges frequently exercised their discretion to set

87. See discussion infra Part III.
88. See Matthew Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
17,
2019,
1:45
PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/6G77-T77M]; Rachel Holliday Smith, Manhattan Jail Design Forges
Ahead Even as Plan to Replace Rikers Is Delayed to 2027,
CITY
(Oct.
19,
2020,
8:02
PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/19/21524219/manhattan-jail-tombs-replace-rikers-delayed
-nyc [https://perma.cc/L52S-AS2T].
89. The reforms largely relate to speedy trial, discovery, and bail. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 30.30, 245.10, 500.10 (McKinney 2020).
90. Prior to 2020, the applicable bail statute provided that, “[w]ith respect to any principal,
the court must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure
his court attendance when required.” Id. § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2019).
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high amounts of cash bail in cases where a person’s appearance in court
could be assured through other means.91 In New York, as in cities across the
country, pretrial detention is disproportionately experienced by Black and
Latinx people.92
The changes to New York’s bail statute did not do away with cash bail
completely, but instead require pretrial release without money bail for most
types of misdemeanor and non-violent felony offenses.93 In cases where bail
would still be set, the law mandated that judges issue an easier-to-pay form
of bail.94 Notably, the reforms also required a waiting period and notice to
the accused before the issuance of a bench warrant after a missed court date
and mandated the issuance of appearance tickets for a number of previously
arrestable offenses, which would allow a charged person to return to court at
a later date for arraignment as opposed to being held for 24 hours or more
before arraignment.95 These changes have tremendous potential to reduce
the number of people who are detained pre-trial.

91. See INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., AGAINST THE ODDS: AN EXPERIMENT TO
PROMOTE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BAIL IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 4 (2017),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Against_the_Odds_Bail_report_FINAL3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3B6-CY6J].
92. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 47 (2010),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SNM2-MSKK]. Racial disparities have been found to exist at every stage
of the criminal legal process where discretionary decisions are made, but they are particularly
prevalent in bail determinations. Racial bias by prosecutors and judges results in Black and
Latinx defendants having cash bail set with more frequency and in greater amounts than
similarly situated white defendants. See Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The
Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention on Racial Disparities in Incarceration,
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 775 (2018); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”:
Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919
(2013). Some jurisdictions have moved to the use of risk assessments to alleviate some of the
bias inherent in discretionary bail decisions. However, empirical studies show that reforms
using risk assessments in bail determinations have reduced the pretrial population but have
little or no impact on eliminating racial disparities. See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk
Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2018).
93. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(4); see also INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF J.,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2019 BAIL REFORM LAW 9 (2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/new-york-new-york-2019-bail-reform-law-hi
ghlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ANW-S9JS].
94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10; see also Michael Rempel & Krystal Rodriguez,
Bail Reform in New York: Legislative Provisions and Implications for New York City, CTR.
FOR
CT.
INNOVATION
4
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY
_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/94HJ-MNMA]. The court must consider the accused’s ability to
pay bail and post a secured, partially secured, or unsecured bond. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 510.30(1)(f).
95. See Rempel & Rodriguez, supra note 94, at 7; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
150.20(1)(a) (mandating desk appearance tickets for certain offenses); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
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In terms of discovery, New York’s previous law allowed prosecutors to
withhold witness names and police reports until right before the start of
trial.96 This practice kept vital information needed to prepare a defense from
the accused until just before the start of trial and often had the effect of
encouraging people to plead guilty earlier in the life of the case without full
knowledge of the weight of the prosecution’s case.97 The change in law
recognizes that the vast majority of cases are resolved by plea rather than
trial. Under the new law, prosecutors would have 20 days from arraignment
to provide the defense with evidence such as witness names, police
documents, and photos.98 They would be permitted an extension under
exceptional circumstances and also be entitled to reciprocal discovery from
defense counsel after their disclosures.99 Many local prosecutors and law
enforcement groups argued that earlier disclosure to the accused would
encourage witness intimidation, particularly when allegations of sexual
assault or gang activity were involved.100 The reforms also addressed the
“speedy trial clock,” which governs the amount of time after arraignment

§ 510.50(2) (providing a grace period for return after a missed court date before a warrant is
issued); Martha Rayner & Alex Garber, How an Unheralded Change to Criminal Procedure
Law §150.20 Will Overhaul Arrest Procedures in New York, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/02/21/how-an-unheralded-change-to-crimin
al-procedure-law-§150-20-will-overhaul-arrest-procedures-in-new-york/
[https://perma.cc/NP75-S5TF] (discussing changes to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20 as a
“paradigm-shifting development in arrest and ticketing procedures”).
96. See Donna Lieberman & Isabelle Kirshner, Take off the Blindfold: Reform NY
Discovery
Law,
N.Y.C.L.
UNION
(Mar.
11,
2019),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/take-blindfold-reform-ny-discovery-law-commentary
[https://perma.cc/DT39-7SSC]; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Defendants Kept in the Dark
About Evidence, Until It’s Too Late, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/nyregion/defendants-kept-in-the-dark-about-evidence
-until-its-too-late.html [https://perma.cc/XV6H-27XN].
97. See Lieberman & Kirshner, supra note 96; see also Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict
Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan and Brooklyn Criminal Cases, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 523, 538 (2014) (discussing how New York’s previous discovery statute, one
of the strictest in the nation, was implemented in New York City courts); Krystal Rodriguez,
Discovery Reform in New York: Major Legislative Provisions, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 2–3
(May
2019),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Discovery-NYS_
Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/87DB-HX52].
98. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 245.10, 245.20.
99. See id. § 245.10(1)(iv)(B) (permitting extensions); id. § 245.20(4) (discussing
reciprocal discovery).
100. See Ashley Southall & Jan Ransom, Once as Pro-Prosecution as Any Red State, New
York Makes a Big Shift on Trials, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/nyregion/prosecutors-evidence-turned-over.html
[https://perma.cc/9K8P-CYG6]; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.70 (allowing judges
to consider at their discretion a prosecutor’s request for a protective order that would protect
witnesses’ names and information until trial).
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that the prosecution has to bring the case to trial. Historically, this time
period has been measured in ways that allow for long case delays.101 The
new laws limit the prosecution’s ability to cause unnecessary delay.102 These
changes in discovery and speedy trial practices promise more fairness to the
accused through earlier access to information and an expedited adjudication
process, which by extension contribute to shorter stays in pre-trial detention.
Prosecutors and law enforcement groups across the state met the 2019
legislative reforms with significant resistance.103 Among their grievances
with the new laws were concerns about the safety of witnesses whose
information would be turned over to the defense at an earlier stage, and the
excessive amount of work required of district attorneys in complying with
discovery obligations.104 Early on, reporting uncovered that district
attorneys’ offices were training junior prosecutors on how to work with the
police to undermine the spirit of the new law.105
Following the passage of the NYC plan to close Rikers Island, but before
the COVID-19 outbreak, top NYPD officials were already on a media
campaign to stoke fears about the State and City’s move toward
decarceration. In October of 2019, former NYPD Commissioner James
O’Neill warned that reforms intended to change the City’s bail system could
endanger the safety of New Yorkers:
Come January 1, there are going to be very few people that are bail eligible,
so you’re going to see people that have significant criminal histories,
significant firearms histories, and they’re not going to be held in . . . .

101. See Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223 (2015); see also Rory I. Lancman, We Need Speedy Trial
Reform in City’s Criminal Courts, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 24, 2016, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202750433895/We-Need-Speedy-TrialReform-in-Citys-Criminal-Courts/?mcode=1380566249891&curindex=39
[https://perma.cc/6Q8T-2HE5].
102. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30.
103. See Beth Fertig, What the New Rollbacks to Bail Reform Mean in New York,
GOTHAMIST
(July
2,
2020,
8:07
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/what-new-rollbacks-bail-reform-mean-new-york
[https://perma.cc/9QKQ-3AX9]; see also Southall & Ransom, supra note 100.
104. See Southall & Ransom, supra note 100; see also Jenia I. Turner & Allison D.
Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285
(2016) (using an empirical study to compare early full discovery in Virginia and North
Carolina and finding no increased danger to witnesses).
105. See Denis Slattery, Advocates Call on Cuomo to Keep an Eye on Prosecutors Out to
Undermine Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-advocates-cuomo-state-lawmakers-prosecut
ors-criminal-justice-reform-20191107-wejixrv7cbhuppdjfwgf7dh4a4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6WHX-5UF4].
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That’s going to put people at risk, put New Yorkers at risk, put victims at
risk, and put witnesses at risk.106

Perhaps unsurprisingly, statements such as these make clear that the
legislative measures aimed at shrinking the City’s reliance on pretrial
detention have not been embraced by the City’s law enforcement arms,
which remain wedded to more traditional, pro-carceral approaches.
II. HOW THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM RESPONDED TO COVID-19 IN
NEW YORK CITY
Given the context of the City’s steps toward decarceration, the COVID-19
pandemic introduced a new degree of urgency to the entire system. In order
to adequately respond to the COVID-19 public health crisis, all parts of the
criminal legal system had to alter their usual course of operations drastically.
Decarceration requires reducing the stream of people into jails and hastening
the movement of people out of jails by “reducing arrests and increasing early
release.”107 To ensure an aggressive public health response, the system,
through each of its parts, had to eliminate unnecessary face-to-face contact
and reduce the number of people entering and held in City jails. This Part
will detail the efforts of institutional actors in achieving these two goals.
A. Eliminating Unnecessary In-Person Contact Through Policing
Enforcement of social distancing rules did little to minimize in-person
contact through policing during the height of the COVID-19 outbreak in
New York City. In March, as COVID-19 emerged as a public health crisis
in the City, the NYPD refused to heed calls from advocates and local elected
officials asking for the suspension of enforcement of low-level “broken
windows” policing until the end of the pandemic.108 Despite the risks to the

106. Jeffrey Cawood, NYPD Commish Warns City’s ‘Decarceration Plan’ Could Put New
Yorkers
in
Danger,
DAILY
WIRE
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.dailywire.com/news/nypd-commish-warns-citys-decarceration-plan-could-putnew-yorkers-in-danger [https://perma.cc/M7RF-HBG8].
107. Brandy F. Henry, Social Distancing and Incarceration: Policy and Management
Strategies to Reduce COVID-19 Transmission and Promote Health Equity Through
Decarceration, 47 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 536, 537 (2020).
108. As Councilmember Brad Lander noted, the “crisis has put the stark differences in how
our society cares for and values people into sharp relief[;] . . . New York City and New York
State have a responsibility to shrink the jail population by halting arrests for low-level
offenses.” Thomas Tracy, NYPD Commissioner Says ‘No Intention’ of Reducing Arrests Amid
Coronavirus Crisis, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2020, 4:41 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/coronavirus/ny-nypd-wont-reduce-arrests-coronavirus-crisis20200321-ae6ltasujjelbdpkgefbkfpuuu-story.html [https://perma.cc/93E4-8KUB]. Public
Advocate Jumaane Williams has also joined calls to end all arrests for minor offenses, stating
that “[i]f we continue to knowingly expose the most vulnerable New Yorkers to this disease
through over policing of broken-windows offenses, those values are laid bare.” Id.
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members of the NYPD and to residents of New York City, NYPD Police
Commissioner Dermot Shea publicly responded that he “ha[d] no intention
of strategically cutting enforcement specifically related to th[e]
coronavirus.”109 Despite Shea’s statement, the circumstances of the
pandemic resulted in a decrease in arrests — by “March, the New York City
Police Department made about 13,000 arrests, a 30-percent drop from the
same month a year before.”110 Although arrest numbers decreased overall,
concerns about how police officers exercised their discretion persist.
As the NYPD attempted to shift to a public health enforcement role, news
reports supported by data and video footage raised concerns about the
aggressive and disparate way that the NYPD engaged with New Yorkers
while enforcing government social distancing orders. In May, reports of
violent arrests resulting in people being assaulted while being ticketed or
arrested surfaced.111 The aggressive enforcement of social distancing
violations in predominately Black and Latinx neighborhoods was juxtaposed
to images of police officers handing out masks to mostly white visitors in the
City’s neighborhood parks.112 Numbers released by the Brooklyn District
Attorney’s Office showed that from March 17 through May 4, the NYPD
arrested 40 people for social distancing-related violations.113 “Of those
arrested, 35 people were black, four were Hispanic and one was white. More

109. Id.; see also Will Feuer, More Than 1,000 New York City Police Officers Have the
Coronavirus as 911 Calls Hit Records, CNBC (Apr. 1, 2020, 2:07 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/01/more-than-1000-new-york-city-police-officers-are-infect
ed-with-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/32AQ-HXUB] (noting that as of April 1, 2020,
over 1,400 of the NYPD’s more than 36,000 employees had tested positive for COVID-19
and 17% of the force had called out sick on one specific day).
110. Weihua Li, Police Arrested Fewer People During Coronavirus Shutdowns — Even
Fewer Were White, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 6, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/02/police-arrested-fewer-people-during-corona
virus-shutdowns-even-fewer-were-white [https://perma.cc/T6TK-PGLX]. A search of NYC
OpenData indicates 19,672 arrests in March of 2019. See NYPD Arrests Data (Historic), NYC
OPENDATA,
https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Public-Safety/NYPD-Arrests-Data-Historic-/8h9b-rp9u
[https://perma.cc/EHY8-G2AD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (follow “create visualization”
hyperlink; then “filters” hyperlink; then “add filter” hyperlink; then “ARREST_DATE”
hyperlink; set range “03/01/2019 to 03/31/2019”; then “Apply” hyperlink).
111. See Josiah Bates, ‘We Cannot Police Our Way out of a Pandemic.’ Experts, Police
Union Say NYPD Should Not Be Enforcing Social Distance Rules Amid COVID-19, TIME
(May
7,
2020,
5:03
PM),
https://time.com/5832403/nypd-pandemic-police-social-distancing-arrests/
[https://perma.cc/8VWH-QLTT].
112. See Ashley Southall, Scrutiny of Social-Distance Policing as 35 of 40 Arrested Are
Black,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2020,
3:48
PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/nyregion/nypd-social-distancing-race-coronavirus.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3A5E-S67F].
113. See id.

2020]

DECARCERATING NEW YORK CITY

77

than a third of the arrests were made in the predominantly black
neighborhood of Brownsville. No arrests were made in the more white
Brooklyn neighborhood of Park Slope.”114 Even the NYPD’s own figures
showed that citywide, from March 16 through May 10, 93% of
COVID-19-related arrests were of Black and Latinx New Yorkers.115 The
data sparked comparisons to the City’s long, troubled history of racist police
stops in the practice of stop-and-frisk policing.116
In late May 2020, anger over systemic racism in the criminal legal system
and the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis prompted protests and
civil unrest in the streets of New York City and in cities across the country.
In New York City streets, interactions with law enforcement depicted on
video showed officers using violent displays of force and aggressive
tactics.117 Video captured a young protestor violently hurled to the ground,
someone in a quick-moving NYPD vehicle opening a car door to hit a
protestor, and demonstrators being corralled and charged with batons and
pepper spray.118 Since the protests erupted in New York City, over 200
incidents of police misconduct have been reported to the City’s Civilian
Complaint Review Board.119
All told, more than 2,000 people were arrested during the summer
protests, while the COVID-19 pandemic continued. Many of the people
arrested reported waiting for long hours in cramped holding cells.120 Both
before and during the protests, videos that went viral on social media also
showed officers not maintaining social distancing regulations or incorrectly

114. Id.
115. See Kevin Duggan, NYPD Stats Find That 93% of COVID-19-Related Arrests Are
Made
Up
of
People
of
Color,
AMNEWYORK
(May
12,
2020),
https://www.amny.com/police-fire/nypd-stats-find-that-93-of-covid-19-related-arrests-are-m
ade-up-of-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/273X-7K49].
116. See Southall, supra note 112. These numbers parallel the racial disparities in NYPD
policing practices generally, where Black and Latinx people are disproportionately stopped
and frisked, arrested for marijuana offenses, targeted for buy-and-bust operations, or given
summonses for non-criminal conduct. These persistent disparities suggest that racist policing
practices are so deeply entrenched in NYPD’s culture that even a public health crisis caused
by a novel viral pathogen cannot disrupt them.
117. See Ali Watkins, They Were Arrested During the Protests. Here’s What Happened
Next,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/nyregion/ny-protest-arrests.html
[https://perma.cc/4GEN-MUKW].
118. See Ethan Geringer-Sameth, A Month After Historic Curfew, Many Unanswered
Questions About How City Policed Protests, Looting, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 8, 2020),
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9575-new-york-city-curfew-unanswered-questions-ny
pd-de-blasio-protests-looting [https://perma.cc/6NR3-DKP4].
119. See id.
120. See Watkins, supra note 117.
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using masks and other personal protective equipment while interacting with
New York residents.121
As such, the NYPD’s aggressive social distancing enforcement and
policing of protestors did little to diminish face to face contact and exposure
related to the COVID-19 outbreak.
B. Reducing the Population in City Jails
As the COVID-19 outbreak spread throughout New York City, many
advocates and public health experts expressed grave concerns about how
conditions in City jails would hasten the spread of the virus and have a deadly
impact on detainees, employees, and their families.122 When the outbreak
began in March, there were approximately 5,300 people in City jails, over
900 of them over the age of 50.123 As fears about the virus developed, people
who worked and were held within City facilities reported a lack of basic
interventions to aid in preventing the spread of COVID-19.124 There was
limited access to soap, hand sanitizer, cleaning supplies, masks, or other
personal protective equipment; people were housed together in small, shared
spaces that lack adequate ventilation.125 As one detained person described,
“[i]n my dorm we’d started sleeping head-to-toe. Imagine a big open room
with 60 single beds less than 2 feet apart. There were only 51 or 52 men in

121. See Bates, supra note 111; see also Melissa Gira Grant, The Pandemic Surveillance
State,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(May
8,
2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/157639/pandemic-surveillance-state
[https://perma.cc/6Y9F-YBQZ].
122. See Lippman & Nims, supra note 20.
123. See New York City Must Act Now on COVID-19 at Rikers Island, VERA INST. JUST.
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/coronavirus-guidance-rikers-island.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LM7T-7E5W]; see also NYC Officials Call for Release of ‘Most at Risk’ on
Rikers Island as More Test Positive for Virus, NBC N.Y. (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:22 PM),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nyc-officials-call-for-release-of-most-at-risk-on-ri
kers-prison-as-more-test-positive-for-virus/2333348/ [https://perma.cc/EJA2-7QML].
124. See Reuven Blau & Rosa Goldensohn, Little Relief for Jails’ Most Vulnerable as
Pandemic Grows, CITY (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:59 PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/coronavirus/2020/3/19/21210419/little-relief-for-jails-most-vulnera
ble-as-pandemic-grows [https://perma.cc/78H9-QDJP]; Christina Carrega, Shampoo, Watery
Soap to Disinfect: Conditions on Rikers Island During COVID-19 Unsafe, Some Inmates Say,
ABC
NEWS
(Mar.
29,
2020,
2:51
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/shampoo-watery-soap-disinfect-conditions-rikers-island-cov
id/story?id=69767859 [https://perma.cc/7LLT-L25Q].
125. See Courtney Gross, NYC Correction Investigator Dies of Coronavirus, SPECTRUM
NEWS
(Mar.
16,
2020,
2:00
PM),
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/coronavirus-blog/2020/03/16/nyc-correction-employ
ee-dies-of-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/X8X6-5LXG].
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the dorm on any given day, but everyone is still close together.”126 Public
defenders in New York City issued a joint statement raising these concerns
and calling for courts, corrections, and elected officials to take drastic
measures to reduce the population of people held in detention.127
Over three days in mid-March, a civilian corrections investigator passed
away from the virus, and both a security corrections officer and a detained
person in Rikers Island tested positive.128 These cases sparked public
responses to concerns that the virus had begun spreading within City jails. 129
Medical professionals working within City jail facilities recognized that
sounding alarms behind the scenes was no longer sufficient to address the
urgent moral crisis unfolding and took the rare step of speaking publicly
about their observations.130 In a rare public statement, Ross MacDonald, the
Chief Medical Officer for Health Services at Rikers, expressed his grave
concerns through a public thread on social media. He wrote:
A message from the Chief Physician of Rikers Island for the judges and
prosecutors of New York: We who care for those you detain noticed how
swiftly you closed your courts in response to #COVID19 . . . . This was
fundamentally an act of social distancing, a sound strategy in public health.
But the luxury that allows you to protect yourselves, carries with it an
obligation to those you detain. . . . You must not leave them in harm’s
way.131

126. Donald Kagan, I Was at Rikers While Coronavirus Spread. Getting out Was Just as
Surreal,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Apr.
8,
2020,
4:00
PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/08/i-was-at-rikers-while-coronavirus-spread-ge
tting-out-was-just-as-surreal [https://perma.cc/442A-EHCE] (Donald Kagan’s words as told
to Nicole Lewis).
127. See Press Release, Legal Aid Soc’y et al., Joint Defender Statement Calling for
Immediate Release of Vulnerable Incarcerated New Yorkers in Response to Coronavirus
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/03-12-20-Joint-Defender-Statement-Cal
ling-for-Immediate-Release-of-Vulnerable-Incarcerated-New-Yorkers-in-Response-to-Coro
navirus.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN6L-H8U8].
128. See Gross, supra note 125; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, A Rikers Island Doctor
Speaks Out to Save Her Elderly Patients from the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-rikers-island-doctor-speaks-out-to-save-herelderly-patients-from-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/7JDB-EMP4].
129. See Josiah Bates, ‘We Feel Like All of Us Are Gonna Get Corona.’ Anticipating
COVID-19 Outbreaks, Rikers Island Offers Warning for U.S. Jails, Prisons, TIME (Mar. 24,
2020,
1:53
PM),
https://time.com/5808020/rikers-island-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/ZVD9-CBQS].
130. See Gonnerman, supra note 128.
131. Ross MacDonald (@RossMacDonaldMD), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:51 PM),
https://twitter.com/RossMacDonaldMD/status/1240455796946800641
[https://perma.cc/C6J7-3SMZ].
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Medical professionals also made it clear that a large-scale move to
depopulate City jails was necessary for a meaningful impact on the people
released and the detainees and employees who would remain.132
As an initial response to the need to depopulate City jails, Mayor de Blasio
announced that the NYPD and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice
(MOCJ) had identified a mere 40 people for release, pending the local district
attorneys’ offices’ and the courts’ agreement.133 According to the Mayor,
this initial release was based on pre-existing health conditions or the minor
nature of the charges of the people being held.134 The Board of Correction,
New York City’s independent correctional oversight board, echoed the
appeals of health professionals and advocates and called on the leaders of
courts, corrections departments, and district attorneys’ offices in the City to
consider jail depopulation more comprehensively.135 Specifically, the
agency requested “the release of people over 50 years old, those with
underlying health conditions, those detained for administrative reasons such
as technical violations of parole, and those serving short sentences.”136
These categories of individuals would account for a roughly one-third
reduction of the City’s jail population.137
MOCJ official data indicate that as a result of working in conjunction with
judges, district attorneys, defense attorneys, and corrections departments on
the city and state levels, City jails saw a significant reduction in the number
of people entering and released from custody.138 Between March and May
2020, the number of people entering jails numbered close to 2,000 people,
compared to more than 7,300 over the same time period in 2019.139 During

132. See Gonnerman, supra note 128.
133. See Blau & Goldensohn, supra note 124.
134. See Julia Marsh & Ben Feuerherd, NYC to Begin Releasing Inmates Amid
Coronavirus
Outbreak,
N.Y.
POST
(Mar.
18,
2020,
7:04
PM),
https://nypost.com/2020/03/18/nyc-to-begin-releasing-inmates-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/
[https://perma.cc/8L44-MALW].
135. See Letter from Jacqueline Sherman, Interim Chair, N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., to New York
City’s
Criminal
Justice
Leaders
(Mar.
21,
2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/News/covid-19/Letter-from-BOC-re-NYCJails-and-COVID-19-2020-03-21.pdf?mc_cid=e78283efad&mc_eid=eee073305c
[https://perma.cc/LJ9E-L2W8].
136. New York City Must Act Now on COVID-19 at Rikers Island, supra note 123.
137. See id.
138. See N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF CRIM. JUST., NEW YORK CITY JAIL POPULATION
REDUCTION IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020) [hereinafter MOCJ FACTSHEET APRIL 2020],
http://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/MOCJ-COVID-19-JailReduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7VL-YM4H].
139. See MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020, supra note 17, at 1.
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the same time frame, nearly 3,400 people left custody, resulting in a daily
population decline of 1,480 people.140
The process of working to rapidly depopulate New York City jails helped
to reveal the complex patchwork of systems, actors, and laws involved in
release decisions. People held in City jails can be there for a host of reasons,
each requiring a different set of actions and approval by various parts of the
system for release.141 There are four main categories of people who are held
in detention at Rikers Island: (1) people charged, but not yet convicted of a
crime who are being held pretrial on felony or misdemeanor charges;142 (2)
people who have been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony offense and are
serving a jail sentence of less than one year; (3) people who were on parole
after serving time in state prison for a felony offense and have violated one
of the many requirements of their parole supervision; and (4) people held for
other reasons, such as awaiting transfer to state prison to serve a sentence of
over a year or transfer to another jurisdiction or agency due to active
warrant.143
Pretrial detainees are usually held when a judge orders bail or remand,
which a defense attorney or district attorney can seek to change upon request.
People who have been sent to City custody as a result of a parole violation
may be there because of a technical violation144 or because they committed
a new criminal offense while on parole. For technical violations, the New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(DOCCS) must lift the parole hold, or the state parole board must conduct a
hearing process to adjudicate the violation and determine whether to restore
the person to parole supervision in the community or order them to serve an

140. See id.
141. See id. at 2.
142. Under the new bail statutes, certain categories of misdemeanor and felony offenses
and certain categories of defendants are deemed eligible for bail or remand, which can lead
to pretrial detention. These include “virtually all violent felony offenses; felony witness
tampering; felony witness intimidation; Class A felonies (except most Class A drug charges);
sex offenses; criminal contempt when involving a crime of domestic violence; conspiracy to
commit murder; most terrorism charges; and offenses involving pornography and children.”
Rempel & Rodriguez, supra note 94, at 2. Categories of defendants include those on
community supervision, listed as a Persistent Felony Offender, accused of harm to a person
or property, and who pled guilty or were convicted at trial and are awaiting sentence. For
more extensive detail of bail-eligible offenses, see generally id.
143. See MOCJ FACTSHEET April 2020, supra note 138, at 2.
144. Technical parole violations are usually for allegations of failure to comply with the
conditions of release, such as drug testing or attending a check-in meeting. Statewide,
technical parole violations accounted for more than 1 in 12 people, or 8.6%, in New York
jails in 2019. See Wendy Sawyer, Alexi Jones & Maddy Troilo, Technical Violations,
Immigration Detainers, and Other Bad Reasons to Keep People in Jail, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/03/18/detainers/
[https://perma.cc/7RYR-9YF4].
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additional period of time on their original prison sentence. If the parole
detention stems from a new criminal charge, DOCCS must remove the parole
warrant keeping the person in city custody, and if bail or remand was set in
the new case, the judge, with input from the defense attorney and district
attorney, must order release. For people held in City jails on a sentence of
less than one year, New York state law authorizes release when “some
compelling reason consistent with the public interest” is demonstrated.145
The Commissioner of the City Department of Correction has authority to
allow people sentenced to less than a year to serve the remainder of their
sentence at home.146 Finally, for people who are awaiting transfer to state
prison or are held on other warrants, a judge or the responsible jurisdiction
can order release.
Effectuating the mass release of people from City jails required a high
level of communication between these various institutional actors. Lack of
clarity around who could authorize release, public safety fears, and concerns
over the adequacy of reentry plans slowed depopulation efforts.147
Additionally, release for any particular individual required a willingness on
the part of the appropriate institutional actor to exercise the discretion
provided for by statutory or regulatory authority. Public defenders and other
advocates urged broad exercise of judicial authority for detained people and
petitioned for clients’ release on both an individual and a collective basis.
Some instances of release were through individual negotiations with
assigned district attorneys, and others were through the filing of writs of
habeas corpus.148 The Legal Aid Society reported the release of “over 130
people through mass writ filings and many more via individual motions.”149

145. See MOCJ FACTSHEET April 2020, supra note 138, at 2.
146. See id. at 2; see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 141, 633, 855 (McKinney 2020).
All jail and prison administrators in New York State already have the authority
under New York law to release people on furlough — essentially a temporary
release — under Correction Law § 633 and § 855. Using emergency powers, these
furloughs can be extended for as long as this crisis persists. At the local level,
Correction Law § 141 allows the commissioner of correction to remove people from
jail when there is an outbreak of a contagious disease within the facility or in the
vicinity.
New York City Must Act Now on COVID-19 at Rikers Island, supra note 123, at 1–2.
147. See Ransom & Feuer, supra note 19.
148. See LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit to Free 100 Clients from Parole Violation Holds at
Rikers Island, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit],
https://www.legalaidnyc.org/news/legal-aid-files-fourth-lawsuit-to-free-100-clients-from-pa
role-violation-holds-at-rikers-island/ [https://perma.cc/ZL63-SJLG].
149. Id.
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When one actor in the system failed to exercise its authority, advocates
would often seek relief through another. In the parole violation context,
DOCCS was notably slow in acting to release people detained at Rikers on
violations of parole.150 The Rikers Island office where parole revocation
hearings are held was closed after an officer tested positive in March,
significantly limiting the capacity for hearings.151 When DOCCS failed to
act, public defenders filed mass writs on behalf of clients held on parole
warrants arguing that continuing to hold vulnerable people on parole
warrants “constitutes deliberate indifference to the risk of serious medical
harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State
constitutional right to due process.”152
One issue of persistent concern between different actors in the system was
whether individuals at high risk for complications from the virus who were
charged with violent offenses should be released.153 The Mayor and the
DOC stated that they would prioritize for release “those over 50 years of age,
and those with the underlying health conditions that put people at highest
risk from COVID-19, including auto-immune, heart and lung diseases,
diabetes, and cancer.”154 Mayor de Blasio went on record to say that “[t]here

150. One tragic case detailed in the news is that of Raymond Rivera, who was detained on
a parole violation in August 2019, and languished in Rikers Island for over six weeks after an
administrative judge ordered his release. See Jan Ransom, Jailed on a Minor Parole Violation,
He Caught the Virus and Died, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020, 4:15 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/nyregion/rikers-coronavirus-deaths-parolees.html
[https://perma.cc/W3DQ-4WCR]. Mr. Rivera became ill with COVID-19 while detained past
his designated release date and died of the virus on April 4, 2020. See id. Another example is
the case of Michael Tyson. Mr. Tyson, 53, died of COVID-19 on Sunday, April 5, 2020, in
New York after being “in custody at Rikers Island for nearly three weeks on a technical parole
violation. The New York Legal Aid Society and the New York Civil Liberties Union had filed
a writ requesting his release the week prior to his death.” Malia Brink, Hero Public Defenders
Respond to COVID-19, 35 CRIM. JUST. 39, 40 (2020).
151. See Ransom, supra note 150.
152. LAS Files Fourth Lawsuit, supra note 148.
In New York, as both detained individuals and staff members began to test positive
in Rikers, the New York Legal Aid Society sprang into action, filing mass writs on
behalf of those detained for technical parole and probation violations and those
detained pretrial whose age or medical condition made them particularly vulnerable
to COVID-19. The initial writ, covering 116 individuals, was filed on March 20,
2020. It was followed by several subsequent mass writs, as well as numerous
individual motions filed by Legal Aid and other public defense providers in New
York. By the end of March, the New York City jail at Rikers Island had thinned
dramatically from over 5,200 to around 4,300.
Brink, supra note 150, at 40.
153. See supra Section I.B.ii (discussing the need for a more nuanced distinction between
offenses designated as violent or non-violent).
154. See MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020, supra note 17, at 2.
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are some who have domestic violence charges or sexual offenses charges
who I have determined we are not prepared to release at this time.” 155
During the first wave of the pandemic in spring 2020, roughly 3,400
people were released from New York City jails.156 People left City custody
for a host of reasons: some paid bail, some completed their sentences, others
were ordered to be released by the court, and others were released based on
writs filed by defense counsel.157 During that time frame, the population of
violent felony offenders saw the smallest decrease. According to DOC data,
of those remaining in custody, 67% were charged with violent felonies, 12%
were charged with non-violent felonies, 4% with misdemeanors, 3% were
serving city sentences, 10% had another warrant or hold on them, 5% were
held on state technical parole violations, and 9% were held for other
reasons.158 As such, the various stakeholders of New York City’s criminal
legal system made drawn-out but modest progress in decreasing the
population at Rikers Island.
III. LESSONS FOR DECARCERATING NEW YORK CITY
The full impact of COVID-19 on New York City’s larger efforts to close
Rikers and implement decarceral policies still remains to be seen. However,
at this stage, the initial responses from various parts of the system at the
height of the initial outbreak in the City provide valuable insight into the
future of the City’s larger decarceral agenda.
This Part offers
recommendations for furthering a decarceral agenda in the wake of the
pandemic. First, the City must adopt a public health-informed agenda.
Second, it must reckon with the cultural institutional norms that continue to
impede a commitment to decarceration. Third, it must confront the hard
cases involving violence, and fourth, the City must resist the tendency
toward regression brought about in the economic aftermath of COVID-19.
A. Decarceration Requires a Public Health Is Public Safety Perspective
When crisis strikes, the high costs and heavy obligations of maintaining
the current criminal legal system are laid bare. The pandemic has revealed
that the City’s reliance on jail and criminalization has been based more on
convenience, politics, capitalism, and racism than on necessity or

155. Transcript: Mayor de Blasio Holds Media Availability on COVID-19, OFF. MAYOR,
CITY
N.Y.
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/188-20/transcript-mayor-de-blasio-holds-m
edia-availability-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/K4QZ-XQSU].
156. See MOCJ FACTSHEET May 25, 2020, supra note 17, at 1.
157. See id. at 2.
158. Id. at 3.
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effectiveness. In normal times, the civil, psychological, or physical harm
caused to a specific detainee, officer, or discrete group of detainees or
officers is typically experienced in very individualized ways, such as a
specific complaint, a death, or a class action lawsuit. Yet the outbreak of this
deadly virus has shown, in a very visceral way, what those with loved ones
ensnared in the criminal legal system have always known: the criminal legal
process causes and exacerbates harm, not only to the individual person held
but to all the people around them as well.
Law enforcement, the judicial process, and City jails interact with each
other in ways that will impact justice-involved people (whether they have
been deemed guilty or not), employees who work within these spaces, the
families of justice-involved people and employees, and the larger public.
The existence of a deadly virus within the criminal system serves as a very
palpable marker of this interconnectedness.
The virus has many
opportunities for transmission from the moment someone is arrested. A
person and a police officer are in close contact, where one may transmit the
virus to the other; an arrested person interacts with other detained people in
the precinct, during transport between facilities, while in court for an
appearance, and in jail. In jail, the virus can be passed between people who
are exposed to unsanitary, crowded conditions and meager healthcare access.
Finally, corrections officers and detainees who are released could then bring
the virus into their homes and communities.159 This interconnectedness also
impacts the community’s ability to manage the pandemic when at crisis
levels: “Prisoners with serious symptoms wind up in the local hospitals,
worsening shortages of doctors, nurses, masks, ICU beds, and ventilators.
People who have never seen a city jail could die because too many others
were kept in one.”160 Each part of the criminal legal system is deeply
interrelated and reliant on the other parts and what happens within this
process spills over to the larger community.
The many people who pass through New York City’s precincts, courts,
and jails experience high rates of chronic illnesses, as well as mental health
and substance abuse concerns. The well-documented conditions of
detention, which include “overcrowding, violence, sexual victimization, use
of solitary confinement, and lower standards of medical care,” are damaging

159. See Leah Pope & Aaron Stagoff-Belfort, Public Health and Public Safety: The
Critical Role of Police During the COVID-19 Crisis, VERA INST. JUST.: THINK JUST. BLOG
(Apr.
30,
2020),
https://www.vera.org/blog/covid-19-1/public-health-and-public-safety-the-critical-role-of-p
olice-during-the-covid-19-crisis [https://perma.cc/JCK7-ECLF].
160. Conor Friedersdorf, Let People out of Jail, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/public-safety-case-more-jail-releases/60
9166/ [https://perma.cc/9DVG-6Z4S].
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not only to the physical and mental health of incarcerated individuals but
also to their families and communities. 161 Many of these realities are the
product of choices about where government and social structures invest
resources. The impact is pernicious and intergenerational:
According to a widely-accepted public health model called the social
determinants of health (SDH), human health is profoundly influenced by a
range of social, economic, and political forces beyond the control of the
individual. Forty years of mass incarceration has had crippling,
intergenerational effects on SDH including: Altering the demographic
composition of communities in ways that fracture family structures and trap
young children in poverty; Diminishing the educational opportunities of
youth; Stagnating economic mobility and widening income inequality;
Exacerbating homelessness; Restricting access to essential social
benefits . . . .162

The COVID-19 outbreak illustrates, on a very practical level, this larger
connection between socio-political choices, health, and safety. Lasting
decarceration requires that institutional actors operate from an understanding
that public health is vital to ensuring public safety.
Detention perpetuates the violence, trauma, and deprecation of human life
that is endemic to jails and the criminal legal process writ large. Those who
work or are held within jails often experience trauma due to the physical and
psychological violence they are exposed to.163 What often results from the
violence of jails is post-traumatic stress, which can manifest as mental health
and anger management issues.164 The effects directly impact the family
members and communities of those involved in the criminal legal system.
This concrete demonstration of how public health interacts with the
criminal legal process should be applied to a larger understanding of justice
and safety in the movement toward decarceration. Despite some actors’
professed commitment to decarceration in New York City, many of the
public responses that came from the local district attorneys’ offices and the
Mayor’s office during the pandemic demonstrated a commitment to a more

161. See DAVID CLOUD, VERA INST. OF JUST., ON LIFE SUPPORT: PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE
AGE
OF
MASS
INCARCERATION
5
(2014),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/on-life-support-public-health-in-the-age-of-m
ass-incarceration/legacy_downloads/on-life-support-public-health-mass-incarceration-report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWT8-3ZPZ].
162. Id. at 15 (internal citation omitted).
163. See Paul Boxer et al., Exposure to Violent Crime During Incarceration: Effects on
Psychological Adjustment Following Release, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 793 (2009); Lisa A.
Jaegers et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Job Burnout Among Jail Officers, 61 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVT’L MED. 505 (2019).
164. See Boxer et al, supra note 163; Jaegers et al., supra note 163.
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traditional and punitive interpretation of public safety.165 The pandemic has
tested the limits of each institutional actor’s tolerance for enabling
wide-reaching and immediate systemic harm. The default response of
institutional actors in the City — judges, government officials, and district
attorneys — has been to think of public safety primarily in terms of personal
victimization: when someone causes harm to the physical or property
interests of another, it in turn harms broader societal norms. However, “the
community interest in safety is often not separate from the defendant’s, but
entwined with it.”166 Investing in the health, safety, and well-being of the
criminally accused and most marginalized people in our communities will
be more responsive to the “complex dynamics” that make up public safety.167
The institutional parts of the City’s criminal legal system each have a
responsibility to care for and promote the well-being of people within the
system whether they are the accused, the detained, someone who has
experienced harm, or someone who works to maintain the system’s
functioning. A public health emergency like this shows that the system has
been criminalizing and jailing people in ways that cannot responsibly be
sustained. A more informed interpretation of public safety, which considers
the role of public health, would require an equal or perhaps even greater
focus on caring for people collectively in ways that are proactive and not
merely reactive. This would reflect a recognition that centering our
interconnectedness will help us all to thrive and be kept safer. Such an
orientation emphasizes how front-end investments in preventative
healthcare, education, and employment will protect the personal interests of
more individuals in the long-term. Much of what can be learned from
COVID-19 in terms of decarceration efforts supports what organizers and
advocates have been pushing for even before the pandemic: resources that
have been used to maintain criminalization, punishment, and detention
should be directed toward preventative health and physical and mental
well-being. Institutional actors have yet to meaningfully embrace a more
capacious definition of public safety, one that recognizes the important role
that public health plays in keeping all individuals safe.

165. See Letter from New York City’s Five District Attorneys and Special Narcotics
Prosecutor, to Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., and Cynthia Brann, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Dep’t
of
Corr.
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://www.bronxda.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/pr/2020/NYC-DAs-Letter-DOC-Mayor-and-D
A-Clark-Letter.pdf. [https://perma.cc/T8XA-HV6U].
166. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE
59,
71–72
(2020),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1291&context=
nulr_online [https://perma.cc/58QA-LBKK].
167. See id.

88

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

B. Deep Entrenchment of Institutional Cultural Norms Impedes
Decarceral Progress
The prolonged isolation that many people experienced for the first time
during the pandemic has opened up the potential to shift public and political
sentiment about our liberal use of confinement in the criminal legal context.
While the ills of detention, police violence, and structural racism are not new,
the stillness of a pandemic has made it harder for some people to look away.
This has led to a heightened awareness of the need to reduce our reliance on
carceral responses. Although a mandated public health quarantine in one’s
home and the perils of pretrial detention are extremely different, a common
link can be found in the deprivation of social contact and the attendant senses
of despondence, anxiety, and powerlessness that follow.168 Many who
previously may not have thought very critically about the deep impact of a
person being deprived of their liberty are now questioning how our criminal
legal system resorts to criminal detention so casually.169 This awareness has
also come at a time of great social unrest and organizing around issues of
police violence and persistent racial inequities in the criminal legal system
and our larger society.170 Increased public concern about the deep impact of
structural racism and each person’s individual responsibility for effectuating
consequential change has never been more urgent.171 Yet, this current social

168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Racial inequities have been observed at numerous points of the criminal legal process.
Drug polices and enforcement have a significantly disproportionate impact on people of color.
See AM. C.L. UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE (2013),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/100413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AM8D-XL7R] (describing how policing of marijuana has served as a
mechanism for targeting communities of color); see also Michael Tonry & Matthew
Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37
CRIME & JUST. 1, 17–21 (2008) (observing that racial disparities in the criminal legal system
exist in all crime categories cannot be fully explained by demographic differences in criminal
involvement). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (discussing the political background
of the War on Drugs and the racial disparities in drug offenses). Aggressive policing and mass
incarceration generally have a disproportionate impact on individuals and communities, and
families of color. See Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime
and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1552
(2003) (examining high incarceration rates within a community as a factor that increases
crime and perpetuates social and economic marginalization); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1271, 1277 (2004) (discussing how racial disparities in incarceration of adults disrupt Black
families); Brett G. Stoudt et al., Growing Up Policed in the Age of Aggressive Policing
Policies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1332 (2012) (providing data and analysis on the impact of
aggressive policing on youth in New York City).
171. See Hannah Giorgis, Quarantine Could Change How Americans Think of
Incarceration,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
28,
2020),
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reality sits in tension with the well-entrenched cultural norms of the legal,
law enforcement, and political institutions in New York City.
The City’s institutional actors must go beyond surface-level support and
commit to shifting the cultural norms of their individual offices in order to
facilitate decarceral progress.172 It is clear from the overall response to
COVID-19 in the criminal legal system that universal support for
decarceration does not exist among the City’s institutional actors. The
NYPD’s aggressive and racially disparate treatment of New Yorkers during
the height of the pandemic and racial justice protests demonstrates that
decarceration does not fit within the organizational and cultural values of the
NYPD. Political actors tasked with moving decarceration ahead have missed
key opportunities to counteract the actions of the NYPD and to stimulate
cultural change within their own organizations. For example, in trying to
appear responsive to the demands of social justice activists calling for the
defunding of the NYPD, New York City leaders agreed to cut $1 billion from
the NYPD’s $6 billion operating budget. 173 Yet, as many have observed,
without changes to the fundamental nature of the carceral arms of New York
City government — such as policing, prosecution and correction —
decarceral efforts will continue to fall short.174
Even the City’s self-styled progressive prosecutors missed opportunities
to take bold steps to advance organizational change within their offices that
would support decarceration. Chief prosecutors are responsible for setting
“‘the tone and culture of the office’ and . . . determin[ing] the direction in
which prosecutors working under them exercise their discretion in individual
cases.”175 Throughout the height of the pandemic, prosecutors’ offices
across the City continued to move slowly and resisted taking decisive,
proactive steps to reduce the Rikers jail population. Brooklyn’s District
Attorney, Eric Gonzalez, took the most noteworthy steps toward public tone
setting by releasing a public statement about declining to prosecute

https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/04/quarantine-could-change-how-america
ns-think-incarceration/610831/ [https://perma.cc/G285-YFNK] (discussing many mutual aid
networks “through which communities come together to share resources,” and that address
the needs of those “hurt both within correctional institutions and outside them”).
172. See id.
173. See Jeff Coltin, Did de Blasio Actually Defund the NYPD?, CITY & ST. N.Y. (July 1,
2020),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/did-de-blasio-actually-defun
d-nypd.html [https://perma.cc/JF4W-AWHK].
174. See Dana Rubinstein & Jeffery C. Mays, Nearly $1 Billion Is Shifted from Police in
Budget
That
Pleases
No
One,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/nyregion/nypd-budget.html
[https://perma.cc/TR5Z-777V].
175. Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and
American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 574 (2015).
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“low-level offenses that don’t jeopardize public safety” and publicly
releasing the numbers of COVID-19 related arrests in the borough.176 While
those measures were a start, there remains substantial work to be done in
terms of changing culture, tone, and approach within local prosecutors’
offices in supporting decarceration.
Judges, government officials, and district attorneys are not accustomed to
thinking differently about punitiveness and social control.
Mass
incarceration exists in large part because of the punitive sensibilities of these
actors, and without directly confronting our reliance on punitiveness,
decarceration cannot be achieved.177 Decarceration requires that these actors
use their positions to support health-oriented interventions at the front end of
the system and make sure that a restorative perspective is reflected in their
discretionary decisions at the back end of the criminal legal process.
Persistent community pressure, true institutional buy-in, and organizational
culture reform will help to move decarceration forward.178 A mobilized
public will continue to have a role in disrupting entrenched political and
institutional norms.179
C. Decarceration Requires Changing the Narrative About Violence
Grappling with how we treat so-called violent offenders is perhaps one of
the most challenging and important aspects of public safety and
decarceration considerations.
The City’s pre-COVID-19 plans for
decarceration raise this challenge and resolve it simply by asserting that jail
and criminalization will be reserved for violent offenders, while greater
options and alternatives will exist for others.180 During the height of the
COVID-19 outbreak, district attorneys and the news media zeroed in on

176. See Statement from Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez Regarding the Coronavirus
(COVID-19),
BROOKLYN
DIST.
ATT’Y
(Mar.
17,
2020),
http://brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Statement-from-the-Brooklyn-DA’s-Offi
ce-regarding-the-Coronavirus-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7E6-47K3].
177. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Decarcerating the Punitive Society, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 263,
263 (2014).
178. See Jacobson et al., supra note 3, at 403.
179. When the public mobilizes on criminal justice reform, the election of district
attorneys, judges, and local political officials who support reform follows. And, as pro-reform
interest groups become stronger and gain further victories, the same politicians who today
fear appearing “soft on crime” might come instead to fear appearing overly harsh on crime.
A mobilized public can similarly pass ballot initiatives to make the system less punitive. See
Rebecca Goldstein, The Politics of Decarceration, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle
of Mass Incarceration by Rachel Elise Barkow, 129 YALE L.J. 446, 471 (2019).
180. See SMALLER SAFER FAIRER, supra note 75, at 17–21.
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concerns about releasing violent offenders and defaulted to traditional
narratives about what public safety requires.181
From the outset, it is worth noting that “violent offender,” as it is used
within the criminal legal system, carries many different meanings and
understandings. First, the term “violent” often has a more specific meaning
in law that does not always correspond to popular perception, and it is critical
that the facts of each person’s case be considered on an individualized
basis.182 Designating certain offenses as violent does not always accurately
convey the individual person’s level of involvement in, or the underlying
facts of, the alleged crime. For example, in New York, possession of a
loaded firearm is considered a violent offense, but the definition of “loaded”
requires only that the individual charged was in possession of bullets.183
Burglary, as another example, is considered a violent crime even when no
weapon is involved and no assaultive conduct occurs.184 Robbery is also
considered a violent offense even if no actual use of force is alleged or an
injury sustained.185 Further, in the pretrial context, those charged with
offenses termed “violent” are the most likely to be held on high bail that they
are unable to afford, making them most susceptible to coercive plea deals.186
For example, of the 39,326 cases charged as violent felonies in New York
State in 2016, 33% were dismissed entirely while only 22% ended with a
felony conviction.187
Finally, even understanding how the term “violent” is often over-inclusive
and how many cases labeled as violent are dismissed or resolved without a
felony conviction, the simple truth remains that in a pretrial context, there
will be people accused of offenses that involve physically aggressive
conduct. Does being in jail pretrial for what is deemed a violent offense

181. See Christina Carrega & Aaron Katersky, Inmates Charged with Violent Crimes
Poised for Release Due to COVID-19, ABC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020, 4:59 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged-violent-offenders-poised-release-rikers-island-due/story
?id=69863436 [https://perma.cc/N2K2-ABXJ].
182. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (McKinney 2020) (defining violent felonies).
183. See Eli Hager, When “Violent Offenders” Commit Nonviolent Crimes, MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Apr.
3,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/04/03/when-violent-offenders-commit-nonviolentcrimes [https://perma.cc/4RB8-ZXKG].
184. See id.
185. See Matter of Rongene D., 820 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Fam. Ct. 2006) (finding that Robbery
in the Second Degree, a class C violent felony offense is established where the accused and
others surrounded a complainant, grabbed his cell phone, and threatened to punch him if he
did not let go).
186. See New York Passed Historic Reforms to Its Bail, Discovery and Speedy Trial Laws:
Here’s the Good and the Bad, FWD.US, https://www.fwd.us/news/ny-session-impact/
[https://perma.cc/4DC7-K3WN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
187. See Hager, supra note 183.
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mean that you must automatically assume a heightened risk of contracting a
deadly virus?188 Violent offenses raise some of the most challenging
questions and more deliberate considerations by institutional actors are
needed.189 During the initial response to the pandemic, the mayor and
district attorneys publicly hued to a more traditional interpretation of public
safety by assuring the public that people pegged as violent offenders would
not be released regardless of their COVID-19-related health risks.190 The
media and elected officials on both the local and national levels consistently
play into the belief that the general public does not want to know that
government is “soft on crime.”191 A true commitment to decarceration
means that all people involved in making the system function are responsible
for explaining the nuanced and individualized assessments that go into each
case. It requires an evaluation and communication of actual data and
evidence-based information, so that we do not simply rely on fear and
speculation.

188. This discussion relates to people held pretrial on charges deemed to be violent and not
people held on technical violations of parole for criminal convictions deemed to be violent.
Technical violations of parole usually relate to a failure to follow parole requirements, such
as not attending a required program or consistently testing positive during substance
screenings. The City’s roadmap contemplates changes to state law to address diversion from
jail. See SMALLER SAFER FAIRER, supra note 75, at 25 (“Current state law requires that
everyone arrested on a parole violation be immediately jailed. The City is calling on the State
to replace this law with a risk-driven system in which those who pose a high risk are detained
and those who pose a lower risk have an opportunity to remain in the community by being
assigned to an alternative to jail program.”); see also Reuven Blau & Rosa Goldensohn, Too
Many Parolees Being Sent Back to Rikers Unnecessarily, Advocates Say, CITY (Aug. 31,
2020,
8:32
PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/8/31/21407412/parolees-being-sent-back-to-rikers-jail-nyc
[https://perma.cc/32TP-J9YX].
189. See discussion supra Section II.B.
190. In one instance of a more traditional, less nuanced response to public safety concerns,
New York City’s five District Attorneys wrote a letter to the Mayor and the Commissioner of
the Department of Correction expressing concern about the requests for release that were
coming from their offices. The letter stated: “[T]he reports that those released may include
violent offenders, are creating a public perception that our city’s jails may be incapable of
providing sufficient health care for the remaining population of inmates. We believe this
perception is wrong.” Letter from New York City’s Five District Attorneys and Special
Narcotics Prosecutor, supra note 165; see also Carrega & Katersky, supra note 181.
191. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 444–46 (2006);
see also RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 106–07, 111 (2019); Gottschalk, supra note 175, at 589 (“Qualitative gauges
of public opinion (such as focus groups) and surveys that permit respondents to rank their
policy preferences indicate that Americans have much more nuanced views of spending on
criminal justice than the popular media or public policy debates suggest. Public opinion about
crime and punishment is highly racialized, with considerable gaps between whites and blacks
on key issues.”).
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Jails are not capable of providing safety and adequate healthcare for those
detained there, and the number of people who are categorized as violent is
often over-inclusive. There is already important work being done by
restorative justice advocates in the post-plea, alternative to incarceration
context to address violence. While the pretrial detention context, which
ostensibly carries a presumption of innocence, is quite different, some of the
core understandings of restorative justice may prove instructive. It is
important to emphasize that “[v]iolence is driven by shame, exposure to
violence, isolation and an inability to meet one’s economic needs — all of
which are core features of imprisonment.” 192 Taking on a more careful
understanding of what motivates and perpetuates violence, shrinking the
number of cases that are deemed violent, and finding creative, innovative
pretrial solutions for offenders that cause harm is imperative to furthering
meaningful decarceration.
D. The Economic Impact of COVID-19 Will Present Challenges for
Lasting Decarceration
The swift and steady downturn of the economy due to COVID-19, along
with backlash from the racial justice movement, will potentially create a
number of factors that can threaten decarceration efforts in New York City.
One uncomfortable lesson that comes from the response related to
COVID-19 is that we have to be able to tolerate a certain level of regression
while we are working toward lasting decarceration. Many justice-involved
people struggled financially even when the economy was at its best. Now,
with severe budget deficits and record levels of unemployment brought on
by the economic crisis of COVID-19, marginalization for justice-involved
people will only deepen. As Professor Chaz Arnett warns, “[f]inancial
downturns may act not only to generate economic insecurity, but also to
increase punitiveness. This can happen in several ways during times of
economic instability, from scapegoating particular people or communities,
to seeking political traction through punitive measures for symbolic
value.”193
There is already evidence of this scapegoating and political posturing. As
crime rates in New York City have ticked up, the Mayor and Police
Commissioner have claimed that the pandemic, the protests, and the state

192. Michelle Alexander, Reckoning with Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2019, 11:03 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/opinion/violence-criminal-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/RDX7-6DE7].
193. Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 661
(2019).
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reforms to the bail statute are responsible.194 Others within law enforcement
have placed blame on detainees released because of COVID-19.195
However, many of these claims have been proven to be unfounded. The
NYPD’s own data confirms that “the state’s new bail law and the mass
release of inmates from city jails in recent months because of the coronavirus
outbreak played almost no role in the spike in shootings.” 196 Of the 1,500
people released from Rikers during the height of the pandemic in March and
April, only seven had been rearrested in connection with weapons
offenses.197
Many in law enforcement who have not supported decarceration at any
point will seize on economic and social challenges to fuel deeper
entrenchment of “get tough” policies and approaches.198 In light of the
economic fallout from COVID-19 and political efforts to impede decarceral
progress, bold reentry reforms such as incarceration-related debt relief and
social safety net programs that are inclusive of people with criminal histories
are needed.199
CONCLUSION
The outbreak of COVID-19 highlights the deep-seated resistance to
decarceration in the City of New York and the challenges for decarceration
across the country. Even in the face of calls from the physicians responsible
for caring for the population of New York City’s jails to rapidly decarcerate,
city officials and prosecutors moved slowly and conservatively in reducing
the jail population. City officials must embrace valuable lessons from their
response to the COVID-19 outbreak in order to improve prospects for the
City’s larger decarceral agenda.
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NBC
N.Y.
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PM),
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197. See id.
198. See id.
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Coronavirus Pandemic, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:03 AM),
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